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Product design strategy for recycling is gaining more and more attention within 
the remanufacturing industry. Still, some firms may see the improvement of that kind 
of design to be a less profitable task and their products are still designed to be of poor 
remanufacturability and even disposable. What are the essential aspects motivating 
firms to improve the product design level? How would different design levels affect the 
closed-loop supply chains’ performance? These questions have not been adequately 
investigated in detail.  
This research considers a market where the original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) have the exclusive right to recycle the used products and the independent 
remanufacturers (IRs) can only remanufacture the products with the licensing from the 
OEMs. The purpose is to study whether different licensing schemes would encourage 
OEMs to increase the product design level, and further impact the remanufacturing rate 
in the market. A two-stage model capturing the essential factors influencing the OEM’s 
strategies regarding product design for recycling is developed. Constrained 
optimization method and reverse deduction of game theory are used to solve the model 
and a simulation is executed to compare the profit and remanufactured product fraction 
under different schemes with respect to various market conditions.  
The OEM ’s critical tradeoff of is to balance the R&D cost and increased variable 
cost and the disposal cost saving and revenue from relicensing fee. Based on our finding, 
only when the consumers’ preference for remanufactured products is high enough 
would the IRs enter the market. When the OEM and IR coexist in the market, within a 
certain set of market conditions whereby the no-fee scheme makes OEM keep the 
design level as minimum, the charge of a per- unit relicensing fee would contribute to 
an increase of the product’s design level for recycling. For the two schemes including 
the fixed-part, the charge of the fixed tariff would not influence the equilibrium 















remanufacturer exhibits lower cost-design level efficiency and higher initial cost, the 
equilibrium design level would be higher. 
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市场中关于知识产权的纠纷。例如，佳能公司对 Recycle Assist 发起了法律诉讼，
起因是 Recycle Assist 回收和再造佳能的产品，侵犯了佳能在日本获得的暗盒专
利（Tobias 2007）。美国的制造业中也有数起类似的专利侵权案件，例如"罐头机































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
